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Abstract
While IPv6 is finally experiencing non-trivial deployment, IPv4 and IPv6 are
expected to co-exist for the foreseeable future, implying dual-stacked devices, and
protocol inter-dependence. We develop and deploy a system for characterizing the
association between IPv4 and IPv6 addresses (”siblings”) within network server
infrastructure, with specific focus on Internet DNS and web servers. We develop
two novel techniques for finding DNS resolver sibling groups, one passive and one
active. For 674k observed (IPv4, IPv6) address pairs, we find that 34% of the ad-
dresses are one-to-one, i.e., appear in no other pair. Yet there are also complex
cases, where distributed DNS resolution creates interconnected sets of nameserver
address pairs that can span continents and autonomous systems, complexity con-
firmed using active probing. We then describe a targeted method to actively inter-
rogate candidate (IPv4, IPv6) pairs to determine if they are assigned to the same
device. We find that the IPv4 and IPv6 addresses of Internet servers frequently
belong to different interfaces, machines, and even autonomous systems. Our re-
sults have important implications on network resilience, security, geolocation and
performance measurement.
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After languishing for decades, IPv6 [13] is experiencing renewed interest [18], in large part due
to technical, economic, and political reasons [11, 30]. However, IPv4 and IPv6 are expected
to co-exist for the foreseeable future. For instance, transition strategies, practical constraints,
and inertia imply that portions of the IPv6 infrastructure will depend on IPv4, where hosts and
infrastructure are commonly “dual-stacked.” Understanding the relationship between, and inter-
dependence of, IPv4 and IPv6 infrastructure, and its evolution over time, is an open problem
important to network structure, resilience, security, and performance measurement.
We examine the problem of associating infrastructure IPv6 addresses with IPv4 addresses.
Specifically, this paper focuses on IPv4 and IPv6 address relationships among Internet DNS
and web servers. Previous measurement research has explored IPv6 adoption and penetration
of the broader client population, for instance via web instrumentation [35, 43]. However, less
attention has been placed on characterizing IPv6 within Internet server infrastructure. Several
initiatives [19, 20] and anecdotal evidence [36] suggest that IPv6 infrastructure deployment is
proceeding well in advance of client adoption. For instance, large residential service provider
networks [12], and content providers [1] fully support IPv6, but are only conservative in making
it publicly available.
We term the relationship of associated IPv4 and IPv6 addresses “siblings.” In the case of a
client, the relationship is typically straightforward, with a dual-stacked host producing a 1-to-1
sibling relationship. However, server infrastructure is significantly more complex. “Equivalence
classes” of IPv4 and IPv6 addresses can result from e.g., a cluster of dual-stacked machines that
perform load-balancing. We therefore further distinguish a IPv4-IPv6 association correspond-
ing to a cluster or group of cooperating machines, even if physically distributed, as “equipment
siblings.” IPv4 and IPv6 addresses that belong to a single physical machine are thus “machine
siblings.” Our measurement techniques allow us to differentiate between equipment and ma-
chine siblings, revealing important properties of the underlying web and DNS infrastructure and
the manner in which IPv6 is employed.
We develop three novel measurement systems, both active and passive, for characterizing Inter-
net infrastructure IPv4 and IPv6 addresses: i) passive DNS using a two-level DNS hierarchy that
encodes IPv4 addresses within IPv6 nameserver records; ii) active DNS whereby we probe re-
solvers to induce various lookup behaviors; iii) targeted server (DNS and web) which measures
TCP timestamp clock skew to generate a physical device fingerprint.
Our passive technique for finding candidate siblings of DNS resolvers provides a new method to
characterize a critical portion of the Internet infrastructure. We deploy the opportunistic system
on a large commercial Content Distribution Network (CDN). For 674k observed (IPv4, IPv6)
address pairs we find that 34% of the addresses are one-to-one, i.e., appear in no other pair.
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This percentage increases to almost 50% when we aggregate IPv6 addresses into /64s. And
there are also complex cases, where distributed DNS resolution creates interconnected sets of
nameserver address pairs that can span continents and autonomous systems. To validate and
better understand these passive results, we perform active DNS measurements. We find 73% of
address pairs discovered via active probing also exist as pairs within our passive data. Lastly,
our targeted method allows us to actively interrogate candidate IPv4, IPv6 server addresses to
determine if they correspond to machine siblings. We tie our passive and active DNS measure-
ments by using the targeted technique to refine equipment sibling equivalence classes to more
precise machine sibling equivalence classes.
Associating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, and finding infrastructure siblings has several important
motivations:
1. Internet Evolution: As IPv6 deployment increases (or decreases), sibling associations
will evolve. Our sibling discovery system can aid in tracking how server infrastructure of
the IPv6 network spreads, where we expect, at least initially, it to largely overlap with the
IPv4 network, and with time, be increasingly autonomous, and where the future state is
unclear. Understanding the adoption and use of IPv6 over time is therefore important to
policy and network operation, as well as to network researchers.
2. Measurement Research: Measurement research that aims to understand various perfor-
mance and topological aspects of the IPv6 network, as compared to the existing IPv4
Internet [25, 35], requires sibling discovery. Specifically, a common measurement tech-
nique is to probe IPv4 and IPv6 destinations that have the same DNS name, presuming
that those addresses correspond to the same end-host. As shown in §3.5 however, a DNS
name in common does not imply that the IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are hosted on the same
interface, machine, or even autonomous system (AS). Among popular Alexa IPv6 web-
sites, we find over 25% are not machine-siblings to their IPv4 counterpart, and 43% of
non-siblings reside in different ASes. Our targeted sibling detection can identify such
cases, thereby preventing potentially erroneous measurements intending to compare IPv4
and IPv6 performance or paths.
3. Security: IPv6 presents several practical security challenges. Much of the IPv6 infrastruc-
ture is insecure in comparison to IPv4. Yet, not only are many old IPv4 attacks feasible
in IPv6, IPv6 introduces new attack vectors [16]. The extent to which IPv4 infrastructure
depends on IPv6, and vice-versa, therefore has unknown security and critical infrastruc-
ture protection implications. For example, whether an attack against the IPv6 address
of an Internet web or DNS server impacts an organization’s corresponding service for
IPv4 depends on the sibling relationship. Further, siblings imply the potential for corre-
lated failures that impact resilience. Whether IPv6 infrastructure is deployed on the same
equipment that supports IPv4 is an important hypothesis we test in this work.
4. Reputation: Mapping IPv4 addresses to a reputation has emerged as an important secu-
rity and anti-fraud feature, with several public and commercial offerings. For example,
spam, malware, and phishing block lists (e.g., [38]) provide a binary indicator of whether
an IPv4 address belongs to an abusive or compromised host, while other services pro-
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vide reputation as a means to combat e-commerce fraud (e.g., [27]). Associating IPv6
addresses with their IPv4 counterpart provides one means to understand the reputation
and past behavior of an IPv6 host.
5. Geolocation: Significant effort is spent on physically locating IPv4 addresses [41], thus,
in the same vein as reputation, the geolocation of an IPv6 address can be informed by
its associated IPv4 address if known. This last motivation is perhaps the most relevant to
the present work, as the system described herein is used, in a production capacity, on the
Akamai content distribution network in order to improve IPv6 geolocation [5].
Toward better understanding the relationship between IPv4 and IPv6, we make five primary
contributions:
1. A new passive technique for opportunistically pairing IPv4 and IPv6 addresses of DNS
resolvers.
2. A novel approach for active DNS resolver probing to discover equipment siblings.
3. The first method to test whether targeted candidate IPv4, IPv6 addresses are machine
siblings.
4. Analysis of observed DNS resolver address pairs that finds a significant proportion, 34%,
have a one-to-one association (almost 50%when the IPv6’s are aggregated to /64 prefixes)
and also finds complex, connected sets of address pairs.
5. Real-world deployment of the techniques to gather DNS and website siblings and equiv-
alence classes.
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the three measurement
techniques comprising our system in detail as well as our deployment. We present results in §3
and discuss findings in §4. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
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Our system includes three novel measurement techniques. First, we develop an opportunistic
method to passively discover candidate siblings of DNS resolvers. Second, we provide the first
reliable targeted sibling detection technique, which can be run on-demand, by using physical
device fingerprinting. Third, we create a custom DNS server that permits active measurement
of DNS resolvers. Our active DNS technique ties the first two techniques by permitting targeted
fingerprinting of DNS resolvers to refine equipment siblings into clusters of machine siblings.
This section describes each of our system’s techniques in detail.
2.1 Passive, Opportunistic DNS Technique
Clients rely on local recursive resolvers to perform DNS resolution. We seek to ascertain the
IPv4, IPv6 addresses of dual-stacked DNS resolvers by inducing them to reveal their addresses
as part of their natural lookup process. While this technique is passive and opportunistic in
that a client resolver must contact our authoritative DNS, our deployment on the Akamai CDN
permits collection of a large number of associations.
Our technique exploits: 1) a two-level authoritative DNS resolution, and 2) the ability to encode
an IPv4 address in the lower order bits of an IPv6 address. Assume we control, and deploy our
technique on, the DNS authority of example.com.
Consider a recursive DNS resolver servicing a local client requesting resolution of www.a.example.com.
As depicted in Figure 2.1, the resolver requests resolution (typically an A record) for this host
from the first-level authoritative nameserver via an IPv4 DNS query. The first-level nameserver
responds with the second-level NS, and corresponding “additional” A and AAAA, records [29].
Crucially, the AAAA records of the second-level NS, as returned by our first-level nameserver,
are formed dynamically. The first-level DNS encodes a query’s IPv4 source address in the
lower-order bits of the response’s additional AAAA record.

















Figure 2.1: DNS Resolver IPv4/IPv6 Address Inference: A multi-level authority returns second-level
nameserver AAAA records encoding a query’s IPv4 source in the lower-order bits. The second-level
nameserver associates IPv6 sources with the IPv4 encoded in the destination IPv6.
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For example, Figure 2.1 shows the first-level DNS responding to a DNS resolver’s query with
the authoritative NS record of the second-level DNS, including an additional AAAA record for
the second-level nameserver that includes the querying resolver’s IPv4 source address in the
low-order bits. The recursive DNS resolver may use either the A or AAAA address for the
second-level resolution. When the latter is used and the second-level DNS receives the query
from the DNS resolver, it pairs the IPv6 source address of that query with the IPv4 address
encoded in the IPv6 destination of the query. Note that the dynamically generated AAAA name-
server record is valid as the second-level DNS accepts queries from an entire prefix; we use a
/80 prefix.
Akamai Technologies has deployed this passive technique within its production infrastruc-
ture [34], making use of its pre-existing multi-level DNS hierarchy (whose primary purpose
is to resolve names to CDN addresses that can best serve the client), and has activated it for
a selection of domains. Akamai has used the resulting data collection during the revision of
its request-routing software to support IPv6, and continues to use it as one of the inputs into
Akamai’s geolocation product, [5] where the extensive prior knowledge of IPv4 can be used to
aid in the location of IPv6.
As a practical issue, the first-level authoritative DNS in Figure 2.1 does not know whether the
client’s nameserver is IPv6 capable, as the incoming DNS query arrives over IPv4. Thus, in
Akamai’s implementation, of eight NS records returned, only one or two of the associated glue
records are AAAA. Also, even when the client’s nameserver is dual stacked, it may not select the
AAAA; selection order typically depends on historical load and performance characteristics.
Note that this technique is passive. The collection of address pairs is simply a by-product of the
client’s nameserver resolving a domain under our authority that the client requested. Since the
entity collecting the data is not initiating the DNS query, the technique does not require that the
nameserver be an open resolver.
Also note that this technique only checks whether the client’s resolver can send IPv6, but does
not check whether it can receive IPv6. If it can not, the query will timeout, and the resolver can
fallback to use an IPv4 glue record, yet an (IPv4, IPv6) pair is still logged. This ambiguity does
not occur with the active technique of §2.3.
Deployment on Akamai affords us a rich and diverse dataset; however the general technique
could be implemented on other authoritative nameservers under common control along a DNS
namespace hierarchy.
Advantageous Complications
Figure 2.1 illustrates the simple case where the DNS queries come from a single, dual-stacked
machine. However, reality can be much more complex. Recall that the (IPv4, IPv6) addresses
that are logged are addresses seen by the authoritative nameservers. They need not be associated
with the same machine. It is well-known that DNS servers and resolvers experience significant
load, and that many approaches exist for balancing that DNS query load [3, 4, 15, 33]. A rel-
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atively common case is that a provider maintains a set of servers at a location that share the
load, and also may share a cache or may distribute obtained resolutions. Further, DNS resolver
implementations may perform record pre-fetching [4] to improve performance.
In Akamai’s implementation, the NS records returned by the first-level Authoritative DNS have
at TTL of 12 hours. Thus, if there is shared cache or if the results are distributed, then another
nameserver may subsequently use them and send a query over IPv6, in which case the second-
level will discover multiple IPv6’s associated with a single IPv4. A short TTL on the final A
or AAAA record (20 seconds in the Akamai implementation) increases reuse of the cached NS
record. Furthermore, after the NS TTL expires, if some other nameserver in the cluster does
the lookup at the first-level, then another IPv4 address could be seen by the authoritative name-
sever. In which case the data set will contain multiple pairs which have IPv4 or v6 addresses
in common, all of which are associated with a given cluster of DNS servers at a given location.
This is an advantageous complication from a number viewpoints. For geo-location, one has dis-
covered additional IPv6 addresses whose location can bootstrap from prior knowledge of IPv4.
For CDN’s that wish to associate clients to nameservers, one might generalize an observed set
of (client address, nameserver address) pairs to any of these clients potentially being associ-
ated with any of these nameservers. From the viewpoint of survivablity, or robustness, one has
gained some insight into how the ISP has chosen to architect its DNS.
However, clusters of DNS servers complicate the discovery of pairs of (IPv4, IPv6) addresses
that are on the same interface or machine.
However, in §2.2 we present an active fingerprinting technique that seeks to determine whether
or not candidate address pairs are indeed on the same machine, given one can send DNS queries
from a vantage point for which the candidate resolvers will respond, which always pertains in
the special case of open resolvers.
Another complication that occurs is when there are intermediary machines between the client’s
nameserver and the authoritative first and second-level nameservers. A common case is when
a public DNS, e.g., [2], is used for the IPv6 but not the IPv4, or vice versa. The presence of
intermediary machines is a negative complication from the viewpoint of wishing to associated
addresses to a common machine or set a machines at a given location. Though, it is interest-
ing from the viewpoint of discovery of DNS architecture and how the DNS is being used, as
discussed in §3.1.
Note that when using the discovered (IPv4, IPv6) pairs for geo-location one needs to take into
account that the data set will likely contain misleading information. However, this is not a new
problem, but rather is a well-known attribute of many of the inputs used for geo-location; and
one must sort, weigh, and filter conflicting information from multiple sources.
Example Nameserver Pairs
To illustrate the potential complexity of the associations we gather passively, we present several
example nameserver pairs in this subsection. Often (to be quantified in §3.1) a given IPv4
9
address and a given IPv6 appear in only one pair. For example, the two addresses in the pair:
(119.63.216.69, 2402:7400:0:c::5)
are only observed in this pair. However, just as common are more complex relationships. For
example the IPv6 address 2001:380:515:1::201 is observed in two pairs:
(210.227.79.198, 2001:380:515:1::201)
(210.227.79.230, 2001:380:515:1::201)
and these two IPv4 addresses are only seen for this IPv6. Similarly, the IPv4 address 120.119.28.2





and these four IPv6 addresses are only seen in these pairs. The associations can become more







form a connected set of associations, in that starting at any address and following the associa-
tions, one would eventually touch each of the addresses in this set.
Such sets of address pairs can be complex. In the 6-month data set there is one particularly
large group consisting of about a third of the 674,000 address pairs, and spans hundreds of
autonomous systems (ASes) and multiple continents. It occurs, at least in part, due to open,
public nameservers such as GoogleDNS, and is of interest from the viewpoint of how DNS is
being used, and is discussed in Section 3.1.
Bipartite Graph and Equivalence Classes
We abstract the observed nameserver pairs as a bipartite graph. The IPv4 addresses form one
column of vertices. And the IPv6 addresses form the second column of vertices. And each of
the observed address pairs is an edge of the graph. The graph is not fully connected, but rather
consists of many subsets of connected edges.
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IPv6IPv4
Figure 2.2: Equivalence Classes: The associations (edges) between IPv4 and IPv6 addresses form
a bipartite graph. The connected components form equivalence classes of various sizes. In this
hypothetical example, the nodes in each equivalence class are shaded uniquely. Two of the four
equivalence classes are 1-1 (one IPv4, one IPv6 node), one is 2-1, and one is 1-4. Note that 4 of the
12 addresses, 33%, are in the 1-1 equivalence classes.
We call a set of connected edges (and the address pairs they represent) an “equivalence class,”
abbreviated “eq. class.” Figure 2.2 illustrates a mini version of the graph, consisting of five IPv4
addresses, seven IPv6 addresses, and eight address pairs (edges). Letm-n denote an equivalence
class containing m IPv4 and n IPv6 addresses. In Figure 2.2 the address pairs partition into four
equivalence classes, two of which are 1-1, one is 2-1 and one is 1-4.
As address associations are collected over time, the equivalence classes change too. For ex-
ample, suppose the system reports association (v4′, v6′). If neither address is present in the
existing equivalence classes, we create a new equivalence class containing just this pair. If only
one of these addresses was observed previously, an existing equivalence class is increased. If
both addresses are previously known and are in the same equivalence class, then possibly a new
edge is added to the graph. Lastly, if both addresses are previously known, but are in different
equivalence classes, then the two prior equivalence classes are merged into one, with this new
address pair forming the joining edge.
2.2 Targeted Fingerprinting Technique
Network fingerprinting is a common technique that relies on implementation and configuration-
specific characteristics to identify devices. Fingerprinting may be active or passive, and differ-
ent techniques permit different fingerprint granularity. For instance, active operating system
fingerprinting [26] may aid in eliminating false siblings, but is unlikely to provide sufficient
granularity to gain confidence in a true sibling relationship as the set of possible operating sys-
tems is small relative to the set of possible interfaces.



























































Figure 2.3: Targeted machine-sibling detection via TCP timestamp skew inference.
has been used in the past, we apply it in a novel context to obtain machine siblings. Observe
that any application or transport-layer fingerprint will be common to the lower level network
protocol, whether IPv4 or IPv6. In particular, we use evidence of clock skew, visible from
TCP-layer timestamps, to remotely identify devices. By actively communicating with a pair
of remote IPv4 and IPv6 endpoints over TCP, we infer whether they are siblings based on the
similarity of their clock skews.
Define a candidate pair as (I4, I6). We periodically connect to a running TCP service on I4
and I6 and negotiate the TCP timestamp option [21]. We receive a sequence of time-stamped
packets along with their arrival time relative to our prober. Let t4i be the time at which the prober
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observes the i’th IPv4 packet from I4 and t
6
i be the observed time of the i’th IPv6 packet from




i be the timestamp contained in the TCP options of the i’th packet
from I4 and I6 respectively. Following the technique in [23], we compute the observed offset of
each packet over time.
Given a sequence of offsets, we adopt the linear programming solution in [31] to determine a
line that is constrained to be under the data points, but minimizes the distance to the data points.
We then obtain:
y4 = α4x+β4 and y6 = α6x+β6
I.e., we determine two lines, one corresponding to the interrogation of I4 and one to I6 that














If θ < τ , then I4 and I6 are siblings, where τ is a threshold. Empirically, we find that τ = 1.0 is
sufficiently discriminating.
Figures 2.3(a) and 2.3(b) graphically illustrate our approach using two hosts for which we know
their ground-truth interface addresses. Figure 2.3(a) displays the observed skew from interro-
gating Host A’s IPv6 interface as compared to Host B’s IPv4 interface. We observe not only
different skews, but see that the clocks on the respective host are drifting in opposite directions
and have different resolutions. Hence, we infer that the IPv4 and IPv6 interfaces interrogated
are false siblings (θ ≥ τ).
In contrast, Figure 2.3(b) displays a true sibling relationship. In this experiment, we probe
the same host (A) via its IPv4 and IPv6 interfaces. We observe nearly identical inferred
skew (the linear programming solution determined as α4 =−0.058253,β4 =−1.178 and α6 =
−0.058276,β6 =−1.139; θ = 1.3×10
−3).
A limitation of our technique is that it is limited to interfaces for which the prober can establish
a TCP connection, e.g., a remote web server or a remote DNS server via our truncation method
which we discuss next.
2.3 Active DNS Technique
In addition to the opportunistic, passive DNS data collection, we develop an active DNS mea-
surement to both validate and better understand our passive results. This active DNS measure-
ment ties the previous two techniques together by permitting us to perform the targeted TCP-
based timestamping on a subset of the DNS resolvers obtained passively to further evaluate
siblings.
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dnstest.icsi.berkeley.edu
dnstest.icsi.berkeley.edu
Figure 2.4: Active DNS Probing: We control both DNS probes and the authority of the DNS records
being probed (shaded blue), thereby permitting testing of open DNS recursive resolvers in our dataset.
The authoritative server is specially designed to: 1) force the recursive resolver to alternate between
IPv4 and IPv6 network transport; and 2) encode the resolver’s source IP addresses. The result of our
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Figure 2.5: Active DNS Probing: Our authoritative DNS server returns a series of CNAME results
with alternating IPv6 and IPv4 glue. We probe a resolver under test for our special domain, including
a nonce N. State is maintained on addresses the resolver uses by encoding the IPs along the chain.
The final result is the sequence of IPv4, IPv6 addresses used by the resolver (here A1,A2,A3,A4).
devices. We obtained about 500 addresses of such NATs from data collected by Netalyzr [24]
which were both open and forward to a resolver supporting IPv61. Additionally, ≈6600 of the
IPv4 addresses and ≈2700 of the IPv6 addresses associated with the passively collected DNS
resolvers are open and also respond to external requests. Thus there exist a meaningful pool
of systems that process recursive DNS requests, either on their own or by forwarding to their
configured recursive DNS resolver.
We actively probe these open DNS resolvers, issuing specially crafted queries for DNS records
for which we are authoritative. In this way, we control both the DNS probes and the authority
of the DNS records being probed, thereby permitting testing of open DNS recursive resolvers
in our dataset. Figure 2.4 depicts the high-level active DNS probing methodology.
Our authoritative domains are served by a custom DNS server that is standards compliant [14].
Our authoritative server listens on both IPv4 and IPv6, uses both TCP and UDP. However,
our server returns different results depending upon the incoming request. The server handles
multiple domains that support either IPv4 or IPv6 requests, where the choice of domain impacts
the IP protocol used by a recursive resolver. We can also force a resolver to connect to our DNS
server via TCP by replying with TRUNCATE to UDP requests [8], which signals to the resolver
1There are several orders of magnitude more open and forwarding resolvers on the Internet. However, we are
only interested in the subset of those which also support IPv6.
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that it must retry using TCP.
We initiate queries to the open and forwarding resolvers. The results from our DNS server
for the queried object induce the resolver under test to issue a series of queries that alternate
between IPv4 and IPv6 for network transport. We maintain state between requests by specially
encoding the returned results such that the final response to the recursive query is a “chain” of
IPv4 and IPv6 addresses used by the resolver under test. Figure 2.5 provides an example timing
diagram of the interaction of our prober and an authoritative DNS server with an open resolver
whose addresses we wish to infer. In this example, the resolver has IPv6 addresses=A1,A3 and
IPv4 addresses=A2,A4.
The prober queries the open resolver or forwarder for a single TXT record. The resolver can
only fetch this name using IPv6, but instead of returning the record’s value, our server returns
a canonical name (CNAME) alias. This CNAME encodes the IPv6 address which contacted our
server; for example an IPv6 address 2001:f8b0::91 is encoded into the CNAME:
2001yf8b0yy91.v4.dnstest.icsi.berkeley.edu
This returned CNAME exists within the IPv4-only domain. The next CNAME redirects back to
IPv6, encoding both IPs. After following another CNAME back to the IPv4 domain, our server
finally returns a TXT record reporting the sequence of four IP addresses which contacted our
server. Note that while DNS authority servers may typically include multiple records in a single
returned result, our server only returns one result at a time in order to force multiple lookups and
infer the chain. Our CNAME encoding scheme, combined with DNS message compression [29],
ensure that, even in the worst case ASCII IPv4 and IPv6 encoding expansion, our chains of
length 4 are less than 512 bytes. As 512B is the limit for DNS over UDP, we ensure that our
chains rely on neither truncation nor EDNS0 [40].
Note that our methodology includes several techniques to ensure accuracy. First, each query
includes a nonce that prevents effects due to DNS caching. Second, all state is maintained
in the queries themselves, thereby removing the potential for miscorrelation of IPv4 and IPv6
addresses. For example, to infer a set of IPv4 and IPv6 addresses used by the Google public
DNS resolvers, we query:
dig +short TXT @8.8.8.8 \
cname1e6464.n123.v6.dnstest.icsi.berkeley.edu





The authoritative DNS, noting the three addresses contained in the requested domain, and noting
the source address of the incoming query, then returns the TXT record that includes the nonce




As we will show in §3, many large-scale resolvers are actually clusters, not individual systems.
A cluster might be behind a single publicly facing IP address with load distributed among
multiple backend machines, or might encompass multiple publicly visible IP addresses. Thus,
one can repeat the active DNS probes multiple times in order to gain a more complete picture
of cluster structure when present. Since the DNS specification [14] requires that the recursive
resolver process the entire CNAME chain, these four IP addresses should represent the same
“system” responsible for completing the DNS resolution.2 The replies themselves have a 0
second TTL and the request contains a counter, thus a resolver should never cache the result.
We also conduct a series of requests that force truncation. These use individual queries over
both IPv4 and IPv6 where the authority server forces each request to retry using TCP. Dur-
ing these scans, we collect packet traces on our server in order to capture the TCP times-
tamps. Although the recursive resolver’s eventual reply is over UDP, the extra latency required
to complete these lookups may be easily observed (e.g., even by external parties by query-
ing txt.v4t.dnstest.icsi.berkeley.edu and txt.v4.dnstest.. several times and
comparing the results.)
Although limited to probing IPv6-capable resolvers that either directly accept requests or where
we know a forwarder exists (thus excluding most corporate networks), the active measurement
has several advantages over the passive measurements. This technique forces the resolver to use
IPv6 (instead of relying on a resolver’s preference for IPv6 over IPv4). Since the measurements
all occur within a short time window, this measurement is not affected by network changes.
It also produces a set of up to four siblings, allowing it to more effectively and precisely map
the structure of a cluster resolver. Finally, by combining the DNS CNAME measurement with
our use of truncation to force TCP lookups, we are able to even more precisely characterize
siblings within clusters. While the passive measurements identify common clusters, the active
measurements enable use to identify common systems.
2We initially noticed a complication where a NAT forwarder could send an initial lookup to our server but,
after receiving our CNAME reply, it queries instead a configured recursive resolver for the CNAME. We observe that
most such systems are not IPv6 capable, so we changed our query’s order from V4/V6/V4/V6 to V6/V4/V6/V4 to




This section analyzes results from deploying the aforementioned techniques on the IPv4 and
IPv6 Internet.
3.1 Passive Discovery of DNS Siblings
We examine (IPv4, IPv6) DNS resolver address pairs as collected by the Akamai network,
using our passive technique of §2.1, over a six month period from 17 Mar 2012 to 13 Sep 2012.
Recall that we define an “Equivalence Class” to be a set of connected edges (address pairs) in a
bipartite graph (§2.1). A m-n eq. class consists of m IPv4 and n IPv6 addresses, and a 1-1 eq.
class is the simple, canonical case of an address pair where neither address has been observed in
any other pair, and is consistent with (but not a guarantee of) the two addresses being assigned
to a common resolver.
Figure 3.1 is a scatter plot of all eq. classes, using the relative frequency for color, of the eq.
classes. Figure 3.1 shows the small eq. classes: 1-1, 1-2 are the most popular, and shows there
exists a broad range of sizes, with larger ones often representing a singular occurrence. We
focus first on the 1-1 eq. classes, and then examine the larger ones.
Focus on 1-1 Equivalence Classes
The canonical case of a simple dual-stack server with a single routable IPv4 and IPv6 address
would be observed as a 1-1 eq. classes. Though the converse need not hold as a 1-1 relationship
may also be the public facing portion of a more complicated architecture. From the viewpoint
of finding candidate dual-stack servers more 1-1 eq. classes is better.
As shown in the first row of Table 3.1, there are 553,000 addresses (IPv4 plus IPv6) in the
6-month dataset, and 34% of them eq. classes. Although, not a majority, it is still a substantial
portion, and increases to almost 50% when we consider aggregation to prefixes.
Aggregation to Prefixes and AS’s Frequently, multiple addresses of a non-1-1 equivalence
class reside in a given network prefix. Therefore, for each equivalence class, we examine ag-
gregating addresses by prefix, thereby forming network-specific eq. classes. There is a trade-off
regarding the chosen size of the prefix, where larger prefixes lead to more 1-1 eq. classes, but
also increase the chance of pooling together unrelated equipment. For example, aggregating
to prefixes as advertised by BGP would produce eq. classes with a natural association to the
networks. However, the Network Operator that advertises a given prefix is not claiming that the
addresses therein are located in a given Point of Presence, and are unlikely to be so for larger
prefixes.
Here, we concern ourselves with 1-1 eq. classes whose addresses are likely candidates to be co-
located. Therefore, we consider smaller prefixes to increase the chance of co-location. For IPv6,
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Figure 3.1: Scatter plot of number of IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in the equivalence classes
a natural choice is to aggregate across the interface ID in the lower 64 bits. Established practice
is for IPv6 addresses in a given /64 to be on a common subnet, or may even be associated with a
single interface where the interface ID is varied for anonymity, [32]. For IPv4 there is no natural
choice for aggregation. Commonly, not always, operators assign to servers in a given rack (or
subnet, or building) addresses that are close to one another in address space. A reasonable
assumption (but for which there would be exceptions) is that addresses of servers in the same
/30 would be in the same building. Assuming a /29 is a somewhat more aggressive, and so on.
Fortuitously, given the arbitrariness in choice of prefix, we find that for the 1-1 eq. classes there
is an insensitivity, at least up to /24’s and /48’s.







Table 3.1: Prevalence of 1-1 equivalence classes in the 6-month data set
Data Set Entity Num of v4+v6
addresses / pre-
fixes / AS’s
% of v4+v6 ad-
dresses in 1-1
eq cls
6-month data set addresses 553,000 34%
6-month data set prefixes - , /64 417,000 47.6%
6-month data set prefixes /30, /64 396,000 47.9%
6-month data set prefixes 27, /64 354,000 48.2%
6-month data set prefixes /24, /64 280,000 48.6%
6-month data set prefixes /24, /48 135,000 49.7%
6-month data set prefixes /16, /32 29,000 62.4%
6-month data set AS’s 5,100 80%
restrict to last week addresses 98,000 71%
restrict to last week prefixes - , /64 80,000 79%
random subset; same num of pairs as in
last week
addresses 84,800±400 51%±0.5%
random subset; same num of pairs as in
last week
prefixes - , /64 70,500±400 65%±0.5%
Example in Fig 2.2 addresses 12 33%
form a 3-3 eq. class of addresses. When aggregated to prefixes /30, and /64 they become:
(122.1.94.240/30, 2001:380:150::/64)
(122.1.94.240/30, 2001:380:11c::/64)
a 1-2 eq. class of prefixes /30, /64. And when aggregated to AS’s become (AS-4713,
AS-4713), a 1-1 eq. class of AS’s.
For a more dramatic example, paired with 88.191.68.83 are 101 IPv6 addresses. All of the
IPv6 addresses are in the single prefix 2a01:e0b:1:68/64. The 6-month data set includes
timestamps of when a given pair is first and last seen, and these IPv6’s were almost always
observed in disjoint 24-hour periods. This is likely an example where there is a single interface
and the interface identification (the 64 lowest order bits) varies. Thus, whereas the addresses
form a 1-101 equivalence class, after aggregating the IPv6’s to /64 prefixes, we obtain 1-1 eq.
class of prefixes.
The second through seventh rows of Table 3.1 report the aggregation to prefixes for different
masks, where the equivalence classes are now of prefixes. When aggregating just the IPv6’s
and to /64’s, the second row, the percent of addresses that are in the 1-1 eq. class jumps from
34% to 47.6%. When we also aggregate the IPv4’s to prefixes, there is only a minor increase
in the percentage even for aggregation to /24 and /48 respectively, which is rather aggressive
from the viewpoint of addresses that are likely to be on the same subnet or location. (Aside: the
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choice of prefix has a more noticeable impact for eq. classes greater than 1-1; see §3.1.) Out of
curiosity, when we do an extreme aggregation to /16 and /32 prefixes, we get that 62%.
From the viewpoint of finding (IPv4, IPv6) address pairs that are candidates for being on the
same subnet, we observe that aggregating the IPv6’s to /64’s yields a useful number of addresses
in the 1-1 equiv. class, almost 50%, and that there is little need for the somewhat more dubious
step of also aggregating the IPv4’s. See §?? for further comments.
To better understand their distribution across networks, we lastly investigate aggregation to
AS’s. We exclude pairs where the IPv6 address is 6to4, as such addresses have ambiguous
AS assignments. With 6to4 excluded, 80% of the addresses are in the 1-1 eq. class of AS’s,
Table 3.1. However, this includes the circumstance when the two AS’s are not equal to each
other. (This issue does not arise for prefixes, as the IPv4 is always distinct from the IPv6.)
When the two AS’s are different, by far the most common case is where the IPv6 AS is 6939,
the tunnel broker Hurricane Electric. If we remove the address pairs of Hurricane Electric,
then 51% of the remaining addresses are in the 1-1 of AS’s where we impose the additional
condition that the two AS’s are equal to each other. Of the remaining 1-1 eq. classes of AS’s
where the two AS’s are different, often the two AS’s belong to the same organization. For
example, of these AS pairs with distinct elements, the most popular AS is 7018, ATT. And of
the AS’s that are paired with 7018, 82% are AS 7132, SBIS-AS ATT Internet Services, and
another 9% are AS 6389, BellSouth.net Inc. As an example of different organizations, when
AS 3320, Deutsche Telekom, is in a 1-1 eq. class with a different AS, the most popular other
AS is 8422 NetColonge, which suggest business relations besides what can be inferred from
interconnection.
Restriction to a Shorter Observation Interval As the data set is a collection over a six month
period, some address assignments and configurations likely changed during this period. These
changes are reflected as larger eq. classes, as additional complexity, when in actuality, these
large eq. classes may not have ever existed at a given moment in time. In this section, we
examine this effect by considering a shorter observation interval.
However, when we restrict to a shorter time interval, we actually introduce two effects that
reduce the larger eq. classes, and increase the proportion of addresses in the 1-1 eq. class: 1)
less opportunity for changes in address assignments; and 2) a smaller data set. With a smaller
data set, there is less opportunity for extant complexity to be revealed. (Imagine the extreme
case of just a few observations, in which case large eq. classes are not possible.)
In order to separate these two effects, we also take random subsets of the full data set, where
the subsets have the same number of pairs as present in the shorter observation interval. As the
random subsets have address pairs from the full, 6-month observation interval, they exhibit just
the first effect of a smaller data set.
The 6-month data set includes the time epoch the given pair was last observed. Thus, we
can pick a time period, and then examine the subset of the pairs that are last observed during
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that period. We pick the length to be a week, which is short enough that the opportunity for
address reassignments is much less as compared with 6 months, and long enough that we get an
appreciable number of pairs, to somewhat mitigate the impact of the smaller data set. Also, we
pick the week to be final week of the 6-month period, as these are the pairs that are most active,
and there are two to eight times as many pairs, 83,000, as compared with any other week on the
six months.
Table 3.1 shows the results for the restriction to the final week, as well as for the random subsets,
where for the latter, 10 subsets were taken and the table reports the mean values and the range.
Table 3.1 shows that the fraction of addresses in the 1-1 eq. classes increases from 34% to 51%
when we take the random subsets, which is the effect of a smaller data set. And the percentage
increases further to 71% when we restrict to the final week, where the increment from 51% is
the effect of reduced opportunity for changes in configuration. Likewise, when we consider the
aggregation of IPv6’s to /64 prefixes, the corresponding percentages are 47.6%, 65%, and 79%.
Other Measures for Popularity of Equivalence Classes
There are alternative ways to view the prevalence of 1-1 equivalence classes, besides the fraction
of addresses. Other natural choices are: the fraction of equivalence classes, or the fraction of
address pairs. For the mini graph in Figure 2.2, 2 of the 4 eq. classes (50%) are 1-1, while 4 of
the 12 addresses (33%) are in the 1-1 equivalence class, and 2 of the 8 address pairs (25%) are
1-1.
For the 6-month data set, 77% of the eq. classes are 1-1, 34% of the addresses are in the 1-1
equivalence class, Table 3.1, and just 14% of the address pairs are 1-1.
The percentage of eq. classes that are 1-1 is higher than for addresses or for pairs because each
equivalence class is given equal weight when computing this percentage, and non-1-1 classes
contain more than two addresses and more than one address pair, sometimes hundreds.
The percent of addresses that are in 1-1 eq. classes is higher than for address pairs because,
phrased informally, there are two addresses but just one pair in an 1-1 eq. class. Of the 673,784
address pairs, 93,832 (14%) are in a 1-1 eq. class. Whereas, of the 553,126 addresses, 2 *
93,832 (34%) are. More formally, the ratio of pairs to addresses is minimal, is 1/2, for the 1-1
eq. class, and increases for larger eq. classes. It is 2/3 for 1-2, 3/4 for 1-3, n/(n+ 1) for 1-n.
For eq. classes with multiple IPv4’s and IPv6’s the ratio can be greater than 1. As discussed in
Section 3.1 there is a huge eq. class where the ratio is 14.0.
In the following where we consider eq. classes greater than 1-1, we want to talk about the size
of an eq. class. In terms of addresses, the size of an m-n eq. class is naturally m+n. However,
given the classification of m-n and when both m and n are > 1, there is not a natural definition
in terms of number of pairs, because the number of pairs in an m-n eq. class can range between
m+ n− 1 to m ∗ n. For cases where, for a given m and n, there are multiple eq. classes in the
data set, one alternative we examined was to count the number of pairs in each eq. class and




















number of IPv4 + IPv6 addresses/prefixes in eq. class
full data set
full data set, aggregate to prefixes /32, /64
full data set, aggregate to prefixes /24, /48
random subset from full data set
restrict to final week
restrict to final week, aggregate to prefixes /32, /64
Figure 3.2: Percent of IPv4 + IPv6 addresses/prefixes in equivalence classes of at least a given size
classification, and just classify based on the number of pairs; or refine the classification with a
third argument, m-n-p, where p is the number of pairs. In any case, for results such as Figure
3.2 we found that using address-pairs for the size of the eq. class did not lead to any additional
insights beyond that obtained with using addresses. So, for simplicity in such figures we use
addresses. When focusing on a particular eq. class, as in Section 3.1, we state both.
All Equivalence Classes
In this and the next three sub-sections, we shift the focus from the 1-1 eq. classes, and candidate
address pairs that likely are on the same machine or subnet, to the non-1-1 eq. classes.
Figure 3.2 shows the percent of addresses that are in eq. classes of at least a given size, where
“size” is the sum of IPv4 plus IPv6 addresses (prefixes) in the eq. class. One can view Figure 3.2
as the complementary distribution of an address being in an equivalence class of a given size.
For example, looking at the full data set, the red line, 40% of the addresses are in equivalence
classes of size at least 27. While, when aggregating IPv6 to /64 prefixes, the green line, 40% of
the addresses are in equivalence classes (of prefixes) of size at least 5. Note that with the x-axis
beginning at 3, one can infer the percent of addresses in 1-1 eq. classes, e.g., the y-intercept of
66% means that 34% of the addresses are in an eq. class of size 2, as reported in Table 3.1. The
curves that are higher up in the Figure indicate that, overall, the equivalence classes are larger
and more complex – the distribution has a heavier tail.
22
Figure 3.2 shows that although the aggregation of IPv6 to /64 noticeably reduces the tail of the
distribution, still 20% of the addresses are in eq. classes of size 90 or more. As expected, with
greater aggregation, to /24 and /48 prefixes, the tail of the distribution is further reduced. A
more substantial reduction occurs when we take a random subset from the full data set, where
the number of pairs in the subset equals the number of pairs observed in the final week, §3.1.1
This reduction is due to the smaller sample size as compared to the full data set. That is, the
additional observations in the full data set reveals substantial more complexity. We use the
active technique of §2.3, to perform a more controlled data collection, over a short time period,
and examine the additional complexity discovered with additional probing in §3.3. When we
restrict the data to the final week, there is a significant reduction as compared with the random
subset. Although the random subset has the same number of address pairs, it covers a period
of six months, and thus there is a greater opportunity for changes in address assignments and
configurations. Lastly, as expected, there is somewhat further reduction when the IPv6’s are
aggregated to /64’s for the eq. classes of the final-week data set.
In all of the cases of Figure 3.2, there is a long tail. This is due to the tendency for there to be
one eq. class that is much larger than the others, as discussed next.
“Mammoth” equivalence class
Here, we examine the largest equivalence class. As mentioned in §2.1, one of the equivalence
classes is huge, 8037-9582, which we call the “mammoth” eq. class – it contains 3% of the ad-
dresses and 37% of the address pairs. (The next largest eq. class contains 0.3% of the addresses
and 0.2% of the pairs.) This huge eq. class, whose addresses span multiple continents and are
in over 750 AS’s, is of interest from the viewpoint of how DNS is being used and architected,
and how such a diverse set addresses could be associated with one another (and clearly does not
represent a set of load balanced nameservers at a single location).
The much larger percent of pairs, 37%, as compared with percent of addresses, 3%, occurs
because a minority of the addresses are in many pairs. In terms of the bipartite graph, some of
the vertices have many edges.
Figure 3.3 shows the complementary degree distribution of the vertices in the mammoth eq.
class. That is, the percent of addresses (vertices) in the mammoth eq. class that are in at least a
given number of pairs (edges). Figure 3.3 shows that the degree distribution for the IPv4 vertices
is roughly the same as for the IPv6, though with a somewhat heavier tail. Although 54% of the
addresses are in just one address pair, i.e., have degree one,2 as seen from the y-intercept, 8%
of the addresses are in at least 100 pairs, 4% in at least 300 pairs, and 1% in at least 500 pairs.
As a comparison, for the full 6-month data set 89% of the addresses have degree one, and only
1% have degree at least 15.
1The plots for the different random subsets are very similar to one another.
2A degree one vertex in the bipartite graph does not imply that the vertex is in a a 1-1 eq. class. as the paired
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Figure 3.3: Percent of addresses in the “mammoth” eq. class that are in at least a given number of
pairs
AS 15169, Google, plays a major role in this mammoth eq. class.3 Although just 9% of the
addresses in the mammoth eq. class are in AS 15169, 90% of the address pairs have one or both
address(es) in that AS. 97% of the addresses that appear in at least 100 pairs are in AS 15169.
Whenever the IPv6 address is in AS 15169, then so is the paired IPv4. However, whenever
the IPv4 address is in 15169, the paired IPv6 is not quite always in 15169 - 1% of the IPv6’s
are 6to4 and another 1% are scattered across a hundred different AS’s. This is how addresses
outside AS 15169 become a part of this eq. class. Some of these non-15169 IPv6 addresses
may still be a part of Google’s DNS architecture, assuming that Google has deployed servers in
local ISP’s with that ISP’s addresses. And also, some may be separate from GoogleDNS - if the
client’s nameserver, using the public GoogleDNS for IPv4, obtained and cached the NS records
returned by the first-level authoritative nameserver; and then for subsequent resolutions, sent a
DNS query over IPv6 to the low-level authoritative nameserver.
6to4 addresses also play a significant role in the mammoth eq. class. Although 6to4 addresses
are in only 6% of the pairs, they are 42% of the IPv6 addresses in this eq. class (an imbalance
that is the opposite of AS 15169). Interestingly, for many of the 6to4 addresses, the embedded
IPv4 address does not equal the observed paired IPv4. See §3.1 which discusses 6to4 in the full
3Other third-party DNS providers, such as OpenDNS and DynDNS, are present in the data set, but to a much
lesser extent compared with GoogleDNS.
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Table 3.2: Impact on the largest equivalence class of the 6-month data set when selected address
pairs are removed
After action, recompute eq. classes.
Resulting largest eq. class contains:
Num of Num of Num of
Action IPv4 IPv6 addr.
addr. addr. pairs
no change to data set 8,000 9,600 247,000
omit 6to4 4,000 5,100 230,000
omit AS 15169 5,600 4,900 18,000
omit 6to4 and AS 15169 900 2,000 3,400
random subset from full data set; same
number of pairs as prior line
2,623 ± 214 2,626 ± 335 78,778 ± 603
data set, not just the mammoth eq. class.
It is of interest to see what becomes the largest eq. class when, say, AS 15169 addresses are
removed. Note that if one removes a set of addresses from the mammoth eq. class, the mammoth
eq. class can partition into multiple smaller eq. classes - the remainder need not be a connected
set of edges in the bipartite graph. Thus, we start with the full data set, and remove pairs that
contain the addresses in question, and then with the reduced set of pairs, we recompute the
equiv. classes and then note which is the largest one. Table 3.2 shows the results for selected
removals.
As discussed in Section 3.1, some of the reduction is simply due to a smaller number of address
pairs. Thus, ten random subsets from the full 6-month data set are taken, where the number of
pairs in the subset is the same as in the fourth line of the Table. The mean value and range is
reported in fifth line, and shows that the major cause for the lower complexity reported in line
four is not due the smaller sample, but rather the selected pairs that are omitted.
Abnormal behavior with 6to4
Auto-tunneled [10] addresses raise a natural question whether the embedded IPv4 address (i.e.,
the 32 bits that come after the “2002:”) matches the paired IPv4 address from the discovery
technique. Of the pairs where the IPv6 address is 6to4, 19% conform to the simple, canonical
case where the embedded IPv4 address equals the paired IPv4 address, and the address pair is
a 1-1 eq. class. Somewhat surprisingly, in 63% of the pairs where the IPv6 address is 6to4, the
embedded IPv4 address is different from the paired address. Overall, any 6to4 traffic is probably
a bug: Given a choice between an IPv4 address and a 6to4 address, a host should always prefer
IPv4 unless executing a “happy eyeballs” strategy. Since the resolver also receives an IPv4 glue
record, the resolver should prefer the IPv4 glue record, never attempting to connect to the DNS
authority using 6to4.
Sometimes the 6to4 address is paired with hundreds of IPv4’s. For example, 2002:aca8:101::aca8:101
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appears with 270 IPv4’s. The embedded address is 172.168.1.1, on AOL, and located in
the USA. The paired IPv4’s are mostly in Brazil, but also Germany, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.
This is not normal.
A likely explanation is some sort of buggy resolver software with a hardcoded 6to4 address.
That we receive such 6to4 traffic also suggests that the 6to4 gateway processing this traffic isn’t
validating that the embedded IPv6 address corresponds to the IPv4 address. It is not likely to be
an attack as, if an attacker took advantage of this, the query the attacker would employ would
cause significantly more amplification than the name lookups present in an Akamai-ed domain.
Also, there are stranger cases where the 6to4 is again paired with many IPv4’s but the embedded
IPv4 is not routeable. For example 2002:6464:64cd::6464:64cd is paired with over 250 IPv4’s
and the embedded address is 100.100.100.205, or 2002:10::1:219:dbff:fef9:aa4f with embedded
address 0.16.0.0. Again, this suggests buggy software misusing 6to4.
Although further investigation would be needed for a definitive explanation, it is clear that the
collection of nameserver associations has turned out to have the additional feature of revealing
abnormal activity.
IPv4 address within IPv6 address (non-6to4)
Wemention briefly that of the few, 92, pairs with Teredo IPv6 addresses, (2001:0000::/32)
only one has an embedded IPv4 equal to the paired IPv4. Of the pairs where the IPv6 address is
neither 6to4 nor Teredo, just 0.6% have an embedded IPv4 equal to the paired IPv4. Of these,
57% embed the IPv4 address in the lowest 32 bits.
We also confirm an interesting human-centric convention in at least one major ISP’s DNS in-
frastructure that has been previously observed [16]. The operator assigns the lower 64 bits of the
IPv6 address, using 16 bits to encode each octet of the IPv4 address, so that the hexadecimal val-
ues render as the decimal equivalent of the IPv4 address, such as 2001:558:1014:f:68:87:76:181.
which is paired with the IPv4 address 68.87.76.181.
3.2 Validation Of Passive Technique
To assess the IPv4 to IPv6 associations inferred via the passive DNS technique, we examine
two sources of external information about the resolvers: PTR records and software version.
DNS PTR records map an IPv4 or IPv6 address to a human readable name. We perform a DNS
PTR query for every address in the 6-month dataset. For 14.5% of the pairs, both addresses
have a PTR record. For these 97,821 pairs, Table 3.3 shows the percent of PTR record matches
for the full data set, and then partitioned by those address pairs that are a 1-1 eq. class, and those
in a larger eq. class. Of the addresses in 1-1 eq. classes, we see that 41% have PTR records that
match exactly, as compared to only 1.5% of the non 1-1 eq. classes. Identical PTR records is
supporting, though not definitive, evidence that the two addresses are either on the same server,
or are the public-facing interfaces to a DNS server cluster.
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Table 3.3: Agreement between associated IPv4 and IPv6 equivalence classes and their corresponding
DNS PTR records.
Set # Pairs Exact Second-Level
with PTR Match Match
All 97,821 4821 (4.9%) 47,752 (48.8%)
1-to-1 8461 3500 (41.4%) 5679 (67.1%)
Non 1-to-1 89,360 1321 (1.5%) 42,073 (47.1%)
Table 3.4: Agreement between associated IPv4 and IPv6 equivalence classes and their corresponding
bind.version.
Set Num of Pairs with Exact
bind.version Match
All 8475 6951 (82.0%)
One-to-One 4650 4619 (99.3%)
Non One-to-One 3825 2332 (61.0%)
Next, we examine the agreement between the IPv4 and IPv6 PTR records for just the second-
level domain portion of the name, e.g., foo.bar.com and faz.bar.com match at the
second-level. Whereas an exact PTR record match might suggest that the IPv4 and IPv6 ad-
dress correspond to a common host, a load-balanced or distributed resolver might assign dif-
ferent hostnames to different machines, albeit with the same second-level domain. Supporting
this conjecture is that while only 1.5% of the non 1-1 eq. class pairs have exactly matching PTR
records, 47.1% have a second-level PTR match. Whereas the difference is not as pronounced
with pairs in 1-1 eq. classes, with 41.4% matching exactly and 61.1% matchng at the second-
level. While DNS PTR records are frequently incorrect or misleading, these findings increase
our confidence that our passive technique is discovering meaningful structure.
Lastly, we examine the version of software reported by the DNS resolvers discovered in the eq.
classes of the 6-month dataset. To ascertain the software version, we perform a DNS Chaosnet
class (CHAOS) TXT type query for the object version.bind. 35,921 of the addresses re-
spond. An example response is:
“9.7.0-P2-RedHat-9.7.0-10.P2.el5_8.1”
For a baseline of what is the chance that two unrelated addresses have the same version.bind,
we repeatedly randomly pick a IPv4 and a IPv6 address from this set (ignoring whether or not
they are observed as a pair), which yields a 3% match rate.
For 8,475 of the address pairs, both addresses return a value for version.bind. As shown
in Table 3.4, the version matches for 82% of these pairs, a value significantly higher than the
3% random baseline. Moreover, 99.3% of the 1-1 eq. classes have resolvers that report exactly
the same version.

























Figure 3.4: Percent of v4 + v6 address in equivalence classes of at least a given size, for open resolvers
probed 32 times on September 14, 2012
3.3 Active Discovery of DNS Siblings
As the passive-DNS data set was collected over a six-month period, and contains large equiva-
lence classes, discussed in Section 4.2, we next turn to understanding the results gathered over
a much shorter time frame using the active DNS measurement technique of §2.3. We first de-
termine the open resolvers in the passive-DNS data set, for which we find 6,581 IPv4 and 2,658
IPv6. We probe each of these open resolvers via active DNS measurement 32 times on Sept
14, 2012, requesting resolution for our special domain which induces chains of lookups across
IPv4 and IPv6 DNS glue. Thus, we obtain a data set over a short period of time, about 2 hours,
and for which the same set of nameservers is probed repeatedly. Each 4-tuple of v6/v4/v6/v4
yields either 1, 2, or 4 (v4, v6) address pairs, depending on whether the two v4’s and two v6’s
are the same.
We consider the marginal benefit of repeated active probing of the open resolvers. We examine
those resolvers for which the 4-tuple is obtained at least 20 times and then compute equivalence
classes as obtained by different amounts of probing. Figure 3.4 shows the percent of addresses
that are in equivalence classes of at least a given size, as a function of the number of probes. One
can view Figure 3.4 as the complementary distribution of the size of the equivalence classes.
For example, in the case of 32 probes, 15% of the addresses are in equivalence classes of size
at least 15. Note that with the x-axis beginning at 3, one can infer the percent of addresses in
1-1 equivalence classes, e.g., the y-intercept of 23% means that 77% of the addresses are in an
equivalence class of size 2. The curves that are higher up in the Figure indicate that, overall, the
equivalence classes are larger and more complex – the distribution has a heavier tail. The lowest
curve in the plot is of equivalence classes from those 4-tuples discovered as a result of just the
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first probe to each of the nameservers. The next curve above that one is from those 4-tuples
discovered after the first two probes, and likewise, for the first five, ten, twenty, finally all 32
probes. The Figure shows that with increased sampling, additional nameservers are discovered,
and the equivalence classes overall become larger.
3.4 Active and Passive Validation
We examine the overlap between the nameserver pairs found by the active and the passive
techniques. Even though the active technique probed a subset of the resolvers in the six-month
collection from the passive technique, an address pair from the 4-tuples discovered by the active
technique need not be present in the six-month dataset - one or both of the addresses may be
absent; or if both are present, they need not be observed as a pair. We find that 73% of the
actively discovered address pairs are also present as a pair in the six-month passive collection.
As a somewhat looser criterion, for an additional 10% of the actively discovered pairs, although
not present as a pair in the passive collection, both addresses are present and are in the same
equivalence class in the passive collection. As for the remaining actively discovered pairs, for
11%, one or both of addresses are not present in the passive set. This is not that surprising as
we consistently find that further probing yields new addresses. Lastly, in only 6%, are both
addresses present in the passive collection and in different equivalence classes. This overlap
between two different methodologies for finding siblings, given the large difference in data
collection duration, helps validate correctness of the two techniques.
To put this value of 73% in perspective, we perform a calculation using partitions of the active-
DNS data set itself in order to understand the consistency of the results over time. In particular,
we consider siblings pairs received from open and forwarding resolvers that obtain at least
twenty-five 4-tuples via the active technique. For all such resolvers, we temporally divide re-
ceived 4-tuples into one of five bins. The first bin contains the first five 4-tuples from each
resolver, the second bin contains the next five 4-tuples from each resolver, and so on. Thus,
each bin has results from each of these resolvers. In each bin, we note the set of address pairs
derived from in the 4-tuples.
We compare the overlap of the address pairs in the various bins to determine the overall temporal
consistency of sibling sets obtain via repeated probing. Hypothetically, if an open resolver
returns the same 4-tuple for each of the 25 probes, then all five bins would contain the same 4-
tuples, and thus pairs, from that resolver. And if all of the resolvers returned consistent 4-tuples
(though the 4-tuple may differ between the resolvers), then each of the five bins would contain
the same set of address pairs, and the overlap between any two bins would be 100%. For each
of the possible pairs of bins, we compute the percent of address pairs that are in common. We
find an inter-bin consistency ranging from 76% to 79% with a median value of 78%. Different
partitions of the multiple probes yield similar results, ranging from 65% to 85% with median
values in the mid 70’s. We are encouraged that across the multiple active probes sent over a
short time span, we obtain the same level of consistency as when we compare this set of recent
probes with the passive collection done over a six-month period.
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Table 3.5: Alexa 100K Targeted Machine-Sibling Inference
Case Count
v4 and v6 non-monotonic (possible siblings) 109 (7.8%)
v4 or v6 non-monotonic (non-siblings) 140 (10.0%)
v4 and v6 no timestamps (possible siblings) 94 (6.7%)
v4 or v6 no timestamps (non-sibling) 101 (7.2%)
Skew-based siblings 839 (60.0%)
Skew-based non-siblings 115 (8.3%)
Total 1398 (100%)
3.5 Web Server Machine Siblings
We evaluate our TCP-based clock skew machine-sibling detection technique on the Alexa [6]
top 100,000 websites. For each Alexa website, we record the DNS A and any AAAA record on
May 3, 2012. From the top 100,000 sites, we find 1398 (≈ 1.4%) with IPv6 DNS records4.
We then repeatedly probe each site via IPv4 and IPv6 using HTTP by fetching the root HTML
page. Probing proceeds sequentially using the deterministic addresses; no DNS lookups are
performed during fetching. We conservatively use τ = 1.0 degree in applying the method of
§2.2.
Table 3.5 depicts the machine sibling inference of the 1398 Alexa sites advertising IPv4 and
IPv6 records in the DNS. We identify 839 siblings (60.0%), 356 non-siblings (25.5%), and 210
possible siblings (14.5%).
Two exceptions can cause our inference technique to fail: the timestamps are not monotonic
across TCP flows, or the TCP timestamp option may fail to be negotiated. A total of 195 sites
(14.0%) did not negotiate timestamps for at least one of the addresses. We learned via personal
communication with a website operator that the lack of timestamps in this one case is due to
a front-end load balancing device; we surmise that similar middleboxes are the cause of the
remaining instances missing timestamps in the TCP negotiation. When neither the IPv6 nor the
IPv4 address support timestamps, we can only weakly conclude that they are possible siblings.
However, if one address supports timestamps and the other does not, they are positively non-
siblings.
Second, some TCPs, notably BSD-based [37], randomize the initial TCP timestamp values on a
per-flow basis. Again, when one of the two addresses presents randomized values and the other
does not, we infer a non-sibling relationship.
It is important to note that while it is sometimes possible to infer siblings on the basis of appli-
cation layer fingerprints, for instance the HTTP headers in our experiment, this is not a reliable
mechanism. Figure 3.5 presents one example in our dataset to highlight the advantage of using
the clock skew fingerprinting method. We probe www.socialsecurity.gov and receive





























Figure 3.5: Non-Siblings: Inferred clock skew to www.socialsecurity.gov via IPv4 and IPv6
identical HTTP headers via either IPv4 or IPv6 in response. However, Figure 3.5 suggests
that the IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are not machine-siblings – further implying that these two
addresses will not have correlated failures and will behave differently under attack than if they
were addresses of the same machine.
Among our inferred sibling and non-sibling populations, we examine the origin autonomous
system (AS) of the routed prefixes to which the addresses belong, as viewed from the public
routeviews [28] BGP table. The origin AS of the corresponding IPv4 and IPv6 addresses of a
website allow us to determine whether non-siblings are within the same network, if not the same
host – and better understand the impact of measurement studies that are not mindful of siblings
(e.g., those that simply pick a server’s destination IPv4 and IPv6 addresses and measure path or
performance properties, ignoring that the addresses may be on different machines or networks).
Of the 1398 websites in the Alexa top 100,000 with IPv6 records, 246 (17.6%) have IPv4 and
IPv6 addresses that reside in different ASes. 49 of 115 skew-based non-siblings (43%) are in
different ASes, while 106 of 839 skew-based siblings (12.6%) are in different ASes. Many
of the non-siblings in different ASes are due to content distribution network (CDN) effects,
where for instance, the IPv4 version of the site is hosted by the CDN, while the IPv6 version
of the site is not. Manual investigation of instances of siblings in different ASes reveals some
that are different, but related to the same organization. In future work, we plan to use AS-to-

























Num Machine Equiv Classes
Figure 3.6: Relationship between equipment siblings and machine siblings, as inferred by applying
TCP timestamp method on active DNS equivalence classes.
3.6 DNS Machine Siblings
Finally, we note that the passively and actively collected DNS siblings may be, and often are,
equipment siblings – i.e., a group of machines operating to service DNS requests. Similarly,
a single IPv4 or IPv6 address may represent the outward facing address for a larger group
of machines behind that address. To better differentiate such cases, we seek to identify DNS
machine siblings, i.e., IPv4 and IPv6 addresses that exist on the same physical machine, among
the previously inferred equipment sibling equivalence classes.
We therefore tie the passive and active DNS data collection with our TCP timestamp-based
sibling inference mechanism by inducing remote resolvers to initiate TCP connections via trun-
cation as described in §2.3.
While actively probing DNS resolvers, we capture all TCP packets. We wish to determine
whether the equivalence classes obtained from active probing can be reduced to machine sib-
lings. To cull machine siblings, we determine the timestamp skew for each IP address within
an active DNS equivalence class. We compare the skew of an IP in question with all machine
siblings of the existing equivalence class. An IP is added to the machine sibling group with the
smallest θ < 1.0, i.e., added to the mostly closely matching sibling group. If θ >= 1.0, we cre-
ate a new machine sibling group with a single IP. This creation of machine sibling equivalence
classes continues until all IPs of the equipment equivalence class are clustered. We repeat for
all equipment equivalence classes.
For example, the largest equivalence class from active probing includes 172 IP addresses, 78 of


























Size Largest Machine Equiv Class / Size of Equipment Equiv Class
Figure 3.7: Relationship between equipment siblings and size of the largest inferred machine sibling
group within the equipment equivalence classes.
machine sibling group consists of 131 IPs, while the second largest contains 6 IPs. 26 IPs have
non-monotonic timestamps, while 1 IP did not negotiate timestamps.
We examine the relationship between the equipment siblings as inferred by active DNS prob-
ing versus machine siblings. Figure 3.6 provides the cumulative fraction of DNS equivalence
classes versus the number of machine equivalence classes in the equipment class. We observe
that nearly 60% of the DNS equivalence classes are in fact machine siblings, i.e., all of the IPs
within the equivalence class belong to the same machine as inferred by our timestamp method.
Another 38% of the equivalence classes have at most two groups of equipment siblings. Fewer
than 1% of the actively collected siblings correspond to 3 or more machine sibling groups.
Next, we examine the size of the machine sibling groups within the active DNS equipment
equivalence classes. Figure 3.7 shows the cumulative fraction of DNS equivalence classes ver-
sus the ratio of the largest inferred machine sibling group to the size of the original equip-
ment equivalence class. For example, in the aforementioned equivalence class, the ratio is
0.76= 131/172.
We see that for approximately 50% of the equipment equivalence classes, the ratio is 1.0, indi-
cating that the equivalence class is covered by a single machine sibling group. Approximately
45% have a ratio of 0.5, meaning that the largest machine sibling group accounts for half of the
total IPs within the equipment equivalence class.
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In this Section, we discuss additional details and implications of our methodology and results.
In particular, we examine screening for machine siblings, AS partitioning of IPv4 and IPv6
addresses, and root causes for the large equivalence classes we observe.
4.1 AS’s of DNS address pairs
In contrast to the fingerprinted address pairs of Alexa (§3.5), for which there is not an implied
coupling, we might expect a stronger AS match between address pairs of the nameservers in-
volving DNS resolution. However, of the resolver address pairs in the dataset (§3.1), excluding
those whose IPv6 address is 6to4 or Teredo, 31% have addresses in distinct ASes, as opposed
to 18% of the Alexa sites. If we also exclude those pairs whose IPv6 address is in AS 6939,
an IPv6 tunnel broker [17], the percentage is still 25%. Manual checks on the more popular
pairs with different ASes reveal companies using separate ASes for IPv4 and IPv6, or those
likely having a business relationship, where possibly the network equipment is owned by one
company, but one of addresses is registered with the other. The caveats in §3.5 again apply.
4.2 Large Equivalence Classes
There are a variety of potential reasons why address pairs may form equivalence classes larger
than 1-1:
1. An interface with more than one IPv4 and/or more than one IPv6 address.
2. Either IPv4 or IPv6 is behind a Network Address Translation (NAT) device [39], in
which case we observe multiple addresses of the non-translated protocol, and one or two from
the other.
3. Carrier grade NAT [22].
4. Middleboxes and load balancing, e.g., [3].
5. Auto-tunneling such as 6to4 and Teredo [10].
6. Hosts and devices that vary the lower order bits of the IPv6 address [32].
7. Public DNS services, e.g., [15].
8. Open, recursive nameservers [7].
9. Address changes over time [42].
10. Mechanisms that subvert the multi-level hierarchy, such as manual or automated probes
from different locations directed to specific nameservers.
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11. Shared caches. If NS records returned from the first-level are saved in a shared cache
(with TTL of 12 hours for the present data set) and subsequently used by another nameserver
that sends a query over v6, then the second-level will discover multiple v6’s associated with a
single v4. A short TTL on the final A or AAAA record (20 seconds in the data set) increases
reuse of the cached NS record. Furthermore, after the NS TTL expires and some other name-
server using the shared cache does the lookup at the first-level, then another v4 address could
be added to the equivalence class.
4.3 Relationship of Equivalence Classes to DNS Infrastruc-
ture
An interest in this paper is the discovery of IPv4, IPv6 address of resolvers that are in some way
related to each other, such as being on the same server. With this aim, we first wish to discover
the complexity that exists in the Internet of IPv4, IPv6 resolver associations, so as to avoid the
false conclusion of a simple association when reality is more complicated. We then organize the
set of discovered address pairs into equivalence classes, Section 2.1. In this Section we examine
how to relate these eq. classes to the reality of the DNS infrastructure.
We note that the associations we observe are generated by different infrastructure configura-




As shown in Figure 4.1(a), interface siblings represent the canonical case of a dual-staked host
with a single Network Interface Card (NIC). We term an IPv4 and an IPv6 address that are
assigned to the same physical NIC “interface siblings.” When not part of a more complicated
architecture, interface siblings present as 1-1 eq. classes. However, because of the way in which
DNS requests are commonly load-balanced, a request may induce responses from addresses
of different interface siblings. Therefore, in this work, we explore methods to distinguish
passively-gathered interface siblings from other types of siblings.
Similarly, a host may have dedicated NICs for each protocol as shown in Figure 4.1(b), a sce-
nario that we expect to be more prevalent with network infrastructure such as servers and
routers. We term the IPv4 address assigned to one NIC and the IPv6 address assigned to a
different NIC of the same machine, “machine siblings.” At this point in our research, we cannot
distinguish between interface and machine siblings.
Lastly, as we discuss, the infrastructure generating the associations we observe can be compli-
cated, including large clusters of functionality. For example, DNS cluster resolvers with load
balancing and distributed caches, including pre-fetching – all designed to improve the perfor-























Figure 4.1: Different types of sibling relationships.
Address that are associated from such distributed infrastructure we term “equipment siblings,”
as shown in Figure 4.1(c), where we restrict the term to cases where all of the equipment is
operated by a single organization.
Natural candidates for interface or machine siblings are address pairs that are in the 1-1 eq. class
and have remained so over a period of time, such as six-months, or remained so after repeated,
active probing. Section 3.2 presents the encouraging result that of the pairs that are an 1-1 eq.
class and where both addresses report a version.bind, for 99.3% of those pairs the two
version.binds are identical. Looking at all of the 1-1 eq. classes in the 6-month data set, a
natural additional condition is whether the two addresses are in the same AS (which is a stricter
condition than belonging to the same organization). If we exclude address pairs where the IPv6
is either 6to4 or belongs to the tunnel provider Hurricane Electric, AS 6939, then in 81% of the
1-1 eq. classes the two addresses are in the same AS. So, these are at least equipment siblings.
This percentage is a lower bound on the percentage where the two addresses belong to the same
organization. Of the cases where the AS’s are distinct, the most popular case is where both AS’s
belong to ATT. Comcast is also popular.
There are cases where the two addresses definitely belong to different organizations. For ex-
ample, paired with ATT are e.g. Comcast, Qwest, Verizon, California Education and Research
Federation Network. One way this could occur is via multi-homing at the client’s resolver, or at
a gateway between the client’s resolver and the authoriative DNS, and when the client’s resolver
chooses the AAAA record to query the second-level authoritative DNS, the path over IPv6 goes
via a different carrier. 1
1As an aside, there are also unusual pairings. in over 500 1-1 eq. classes, the IPv6 address belongs to Eweka
Internet Services, Netherlands, and the majority of the addresses are in a given /64, 2001:5c0:1400:a:8000/64,
and where the paired IPv4’s are in ISP’s from all over, to mention a few: Telecom Italia, Deutsche Telekom,
France Telecom, ASTRAL UPC Romania, Comcast, ATT, Qwest, Verizon, Vodaphone, Tunisia BackBone AS,
Telefonica de Argentina, CANTV Servicios Venezuela, China Backbone CNC Group. We haven’t thought of a
standard architecture that would yield this. One possiblity is a probing experiment where the response from the
first-level authoritative DNS to the diverse set of IPv4’s is then forwarded to resolvers in Eweka Internet Services.
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Also, it should be noted that some of the pairs where the IPv6 is 6to4 are also likely candidates
for interface or machine siblings. Of the pairs where the IPv6 address is 6to4, 19% conform to
the simple, canonical case where the embedded IPv4 address equals the paired IPv4 address,
and the address pair is a 1-1 eq. class, Section 3.1. These are consistent with a single server that
has obtained IPv6 connectivity via 6to4.
Considering eq. classes larger than 1-1, it is still possible that in some cases the addresses are
on the same machine. A particular case is where a single IPv4 is paired with multiple IPv6’s all
in the same /64 and where the different IPv6 addresses are observed in disjoint time intervals,
which suggests that the IPv6 is being varied for anonymity.
Again excluding address pairs where the IPv6 is either 6to4 or belongs to Hurricane Electric,
then of the eq. classes larger than 1-1, 52% have all addresses in one AS, and can be inferred
to be equipment siblings. Although smaller than the 81% for the 1-1 eq. classes, it is still a
substantial portion. And additional equipment siblings can be identified from eq. classes where
addresses in multiple AS’s are actually allocated to the same organization.
Moreover, it is reasonable to infer equipment siblings that are a subset of an eq. class. For
example, there is an eq. class 7-1151 that has all addresses in one AS, except one of the IPv4’s
is in an AS’s of an unrelated organization. It is reasonable to infer an equipment sibling where
the address pair containing this IPv4 is omitted. A more dramatic example is the Mammoth eq.
class where Google’s AS 15169 plays a major role, Section 3.1. In this eq. class, the addresses
in 15169 are almost exclusively associated with just each another - only 2% of the IPv4’s are
paired with an IPv6 outside 15169 (and these non-15169’s addresses are scatter across a hundred
different AS’s). The subset of the Mammoth eq. class consisting of pairs where both addresses
are in AS 15169 would be an equipment sibling that spans continents. Also, it is possible that
additional addresses in the Mammoth eq. class are part of this Google equipment sibling if
Google has servers in ISPs’ whose addresses are from the ISP.
In terms of the abstraction of the bipartite graph, Section 2.1, one could consider an enhance-
ment where each edge is labelled by the two AS’s, or better yet the organizations, of the ver-
tices (addresses) of that edge. For many labels, the two AS’s would be the same, but not always.
Some eq. classes will have edges with different labels, and one could examine the sub-partitions
consisting of edges with a common label.
Having discovered address pairs that we think are likely to be on the same server (based on
being in a 1-1 eq. class and in the same AS) we can confirm this inference by using the targeted
fingerprinting technique, Section 2.2, assuming we have a vantage point from which the server
will respond. Likewise, we can expect that some of the address pairs within an equipment
sibling are likely machine siblings, and we could use the targeted fingerprinting technique to




This paper examines the relationship between IPv4 and IPv6 addresses of Internet server in-
frastructure. Our primary contribution is a methodology for characterizing the inter-relation
of IPv4 and IPv6 among Internet DNS and web servers. We deploy both active and passive
measurement techniques to discover groups of equipment equivalence classes, and then tie the
techniques together with physical TCP fingerprinting in order to discover more granular ma-
chine equivalence classes.
While prior work explores IPv6 client adoption and penetration, to our knowledge this paper is
the first to take a comprehensive look at the server-side where IPv6 deployment is active [1,12].
Characterizing server IPv6 addresses and their relation to IPv4 is important in: i) tracking
the evolution of IPv6; ii) understanding the potential for correlated failures and security risks
when IPv4 and IPv6 services are physically colocated; and iii) preventing erroneous Internet
measurements intending to compare the performance of IPv4 and IPv6 paths.
We develop and deploy three novel measurement systems: i) a passive DNS collection using a
two-level DNS hierarchy that encodes IPv4 addresses within IPv6 nameserver records; ii) an
active DNS probing system that induces a combination of IPv4 and IPv6 DNS resolver lookups
in a single resolution operation and can also force resolvers to utilize TCP; and iii) an active TCP
physical device fingerprinting technique that more precisely identifies IPv4 and IPv6 addresses
present on the same machine.
We find significant complexity, as measured by large equivalence classes in both the active and
passive data sets, between IPv4 and IPv6 associations. Much of this complexity is attributable to
large DNS resolver clusters used by large providers. Further complicating “clean” association
of addresses are instances where operators employ shared caches, load balancing, NAT, carrier
grade NAT, IPv6 address randomization, or mixtures thereof.
While we examine servers in-depth, the relationship between IPv4 and IPv6 router addresses is
an important infrastructure component we plan to address in future work to better understand
topological differences.
The primary implication of our work is an under-appreciated fact: that the IPv4 and IPv6 ad-
dresses of Internet servers frequently belong to different interfaces, machines, and even au-
tonomous systems. We hope that our results illuminate not only some of the underlying com-
plexity between IPv4 and IPv6 as deployed in the Internet today, but also properties to protect
critical infrastructure and methodologies for conducting sound IPv4/IPv6 comparison measure-
ments.
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